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WAIVING GOODBYE TO NONDISCLOSURE UNDER
FOIA’S EXEMPTION 4: THE SCOPE AND
APPLICABILITY OF THE WAIVER DOCTRINE
Patrick Lightfoot+
Congress designed the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)1 to provide the
general public with broad access to information held by government agencies.2
However, Congress limited the scope of disclosure by enumerating nine
specific exemptions, which entitle the government to withhold certain
information from release.3 The fourth FOIA exemption protects confidential
commercial and financial information that private entities have provided to the
government.4 Traditionally, courts will find that an agency has waived the
protection of a FOIA exemption under the public-domain doctrine if the
information requested has been made available in a permanent public record.5
The Ninth Circuit recently disturbed this long-held trend of applying the
+
J.D. Candidate, May 2013, The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law;
B.S., 2010, Cornell University. The author would like to thank Daria Zane for her invaluable
insight and expertise. The author also wishes to thank his family and friends for their constant
support and encouragement and his colleagues on the Catholic University Law Review for their
diligent work in bringing this Comment to publication.
1. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
2. See S. REP NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965) (asserting that the purpose of the Act is to eliminate
the loopholes in previous disclosure law to promote full agency disclosure, absent a specific
exception); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 1 (1966) (stating that the Act revises previous law
to increase disclosure to the general public). Both congressional reports accompanied Senate Bill
1160, which Congress ultimately enacted as FOIA on July 4, 1996. Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA), Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 250 (1996) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (specifying the nine statutory exemptions).
4. Id. § 552(b)(4) (exempting from disclosure “trade secrets and commercial or financial
information obtained from a person [that is] privileged or confidential”). The information is
protected to prevent harm to competition, which will likely result from disclosure of such
information. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir.
1974). Exemption 4 is unique because it shields from disclosure information obtained from a
person outside of the agency who intends for that information to be confidential. See Benson v.
Gen. Servs. Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d, 415 F.2d 878 (9th Cir.
1969); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10; S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (explaining that this
exemption protects persons who otherwise would not release the information).
5. See Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (explaining that information
loses protection under certain exemptions once it enters the public domain and is preserved in a
permanent public record); see also Hudson River Sloop Clearwater, Inc. v. Dep’t of the Navy,
891 F.2d 414, 421 (2d Cir. 1989) (noting that the first and third exemptions cannot be invoked if
the government officially disclosed the information previously); U.S. Student Ass’n v. CIA, 620
F. Supp. 565, 571 (D.D.C. 1985) (“It is well established that specific information cannot be
withheld [under the first and third exemption] if it has been the subject of prior ‘official and
documented disclosure.’” (quoting Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1133 (D.C. Cir.
1983))).
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public-domain doctrine by introducing a new test in determining the waiver of
Exemption 4.6 In Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Protection, the
Ninth Circuit created a new “unlimited disclosure” test, concluding that an
agency waives its entitlement to a FOIA exemption when it freely discloses
confidential information to a person without restricting that person’s ability to
further disclose that information.7
The public-domain test is the prevailing rule among the circuit courts of
appeal.8 For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
applied the test in Center for Auto Safety v. National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration, rejecting the plaintiff’s argument that the government had
waived Exemption 4 through the release of automakers’ air-bag-system
information to manufacturers. 9 The D.C. Circuit approved of the district
court’s holding that limited disclosures to people who required the information
was not automatically equivalent to a release of the information to the general
public.10
Congress enacted FOIA under the overarching “philosophy of full agency
disclosure.” 11 The nine exemptions limiting disclosure do not negate this
policy, and the Supreme Court has recognized Congress’s intent for all FOIA
exemptions to be narrowly construed.12 Exemption 4 protects information that
the federal government receives from others by necessitating a certain amount
of confidentiality so that “a citizen [may] be able to confide in his
Government.”13 The public-domain test reflects both FOIA’s broad disclosure
policy and Exemption 4’s protection.14
6. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1196–99 (9th
Cir. 2011) (“While the public domain test will be persuasive in most cases, it does not reach the
concerns of confidentiality in circumstances like those presented in this case.”).
7. Id. at 1196. The court acknowledged that the Agency in question was required by
statute to disclose the information, but reasoned that the Agency’s “no-strings-attached”
disclosure that did not limit further dissemination waived confidentiality. Id. at 1197.
8. See infra Part I.D.
9. 244 F.3d 144, 152 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
10. See id. 152–53; see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin.,
93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000) rev’d in part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144.
11. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also infra Part I.B.
12. See, e.g., Dep’t of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (stating that FOIA’s
broad policy of disclosure limits the Act’s exemptions); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 & n.6
(1972) (observing that Congress intended a policy of broad disclosure when enacting FOIA,
subject to specifically delineated exceptions (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965))), superseded
by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a), § 553(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563
(amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970) to require that information classified as secret in the interest of
national security or foreign policy by executive order be in fact properly classified as such); see
also Bristol Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d 935, 938 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (recognizing the primary
intent of FOIA to increase public access to government records and to close loopholes in previous
disclosure legislation).
13. See H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966) (stating that Exemption 4 “would assure the
confidentiality of information obtained by the Government”); see also Gen. Servs. Admin. v.
Benson, 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969) (affirming the district court’s interpretation of
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Yet, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Watkins constitutes a puzzling departure
from the well-settled public-domain test.15 Watkins’s expansion of the waiver
doctrine will have unintended negative consequences. Corporations and
business entities whose information Congress intended Exemption 4 to protect
will be less willing to provide information to the government voluntarily,16 and
when compelled to do so, will provide less reliable information for fear that the
slightest government disclosure will subject the information to full public
access under FOIA. 17 Thus, despite granting the public greater access to
information in the short term, 18 an expansion of the waiver doctrine would
cause a decrease in both the quality and quantity of information provided to the
government—a result directly at odds with FOIA’s primary purpose.19
This Comment examines the Ninth Circuit’s recent departure from the
well-recognized test for determining waiver, and analyzes both the
public-domain test and the Ninth Circuit’s unlimited-disclosure test in the
context of Exemption 4. Part I provides a historical perspective by examining
the early law of public disclosure, including section 3 of the Administrative
Procedure Act, and the later enactment of FOIA. Part I also surveys the
changing interpretations of Exemption 4 and the development of the waiver
doctrine. Lastly, Part I examines Center for Auto Safety and Watkins in
significant detail. Part II demonstrates how the new Watkins test contradicts
well-established principles underlying the waiver doctrine, which requires an
official, public disclosure to constitute waiver. Finally, Part III advocates for
the uniform adoption of the public-domain test through one of three
mechanisms—a Supreme Court holding, a legislative amendment to FOIA, or
a modification of importation regulations—as the best solution to further the
purposes underlying FOIA.

Exemption 4 as applying only to information “obtained from a person outside the
agency . . . [who] wishes the information to be kept confidential” (quoting Benson v. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968))).
14. See infra Part I.B–C (recognizing that a balance must be struck between confidentiality
and public access to information).
15. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th
Cir. 2011) (determining that the public-domain test should not be the only test for government
waiver because it did not fit the confidentiality concerns generated by the particular case).
16. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(“Where . . . the information is provided to the Government voluntarily, the presumption is that
its interest will be threatened by disclosure as the persons whose confidences have been betrayed
will, in all likelihood, refuse further cooperation.”).
17. See id. (“[W]here the production of information is compelled . . . disclosure could affect
the reliability of such data . . . [thus] the governmental impact inquiry will focus on the possible
effect of disclosure on its quality.”).
18. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98 (providing another means for the release of
information).
19. See supra note 2 and accompanying text (describing the purpose of FOIA).
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF GOVERNMENT DISCLOSURE LAW: THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT, FOIA, EXEMPTION 4, AND THE WAIVER
DOCTRINE
A. The Administrative Procedure Act: Precursor to FOIA and an “[E]xcuse
for [S]ecrecy”20
The Administrative Procedure Act of 1946 (APA) was the federal
government’s first major attempt to organize federal administrative-agency
information. 21 The APA allowed the public access to government
information.22 In particular, section 3 of the APA originally provided for the
release of government information unless it involved: “(1) any function of the
United States requiring secrecy in the public interest or (2) any matter relating
solely to the internal management of an agency.”23
Despite section 3’s broad disclosure policy, “gaping loop-holes”24 provided
the government with “numerous excuses” for withholding information. 25
Consequently, disclosure of official records was only available for “persons
properly and directly concerned,” and information could be withheld from
disclosure for good cause.26 Government agencies refused to release properly
disclosable information in “case after case.”27 In proposing revisions to the

20. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
21. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-505, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (current
version in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). The APA was “an attempt to settle . . . [the] escalating
conflict between public demands for agency transparency and the government’s need to keep
some information confidential.” Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, The Freedom of
Information Act 1966-2006: A Retrospective on the Rise of Privacy Protection over the Public
Interest in Knowing What the Government’s Up To, 11 COMM. L. & POL’Y 511, 521 (2006).
22. Administrative Procedure Act § 3 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
23. Id.
24. Martin E. Halstuk & Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court
Treatment of the Reporters Committee “Central Purpose” Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REV.
983, 993 (2002).
25. 33 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & CHARLES H. KOCH, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JUDICIAL REVIEW § 8437, at 504; see also JACQUELINE KLOSEK, THE RIGHT TO
KNOW: YOUR GUIDE TO USING AND DEFENDING FREEDOM OF INFORMATION LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES 14 (2009) (stating that “little information was actually released” under
section 3).
26. Administrative Procedure Act § 3(c); see also Halstuk & Chamberlin, supra note 21, at
522 (“This restriction thus blocked third parties, such as journalists, attorneys, public interests
groups, scientists and historians, from getting hold of government records.”).
27. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 5 (1966).
The misapplication of these minor exceptions soon made the Administrative Procedure
Act the fountainhead of secrecy within government. Federal agencies exploited the
vague provisions in the act requiring “secrecy in the public interest” or “for good
cause,” and also claimed the right to deny requests for information “relating solely to
the internal management of an agency” unless the requestor was “properly and directly
concerned.” Armed with such implied authority, the government routinely denied
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APA, members of Congress observed that section 3 was “used more as an
excuse for withholding than as a disclosure statute.”28 To make matters worse,
section 3 “failed to provide a judicial remedy for wrongfully withholding
information, thus allowing capricious administrative decisions forbidding
disclosure to go unchecked.” 29 Those whose requests for disclosure were
rejected were left without any recourse.30
Shortly after the enactment of section 3, President Harry Truman expanded
government secrecy by issuing an executive order allowing nonmilitary
agencies to classify information, thus making section 3’s shortcomings
increasingly apparent.31 The growing abuse of section 3’s inherent loopholes
to expand government secrecy, typified by this executive order, fueled the fire
for reform.32
B. The Freedom of Information Act: More Disclosure and More Debate
In 1966, Congress amended section 3 of the APA33 through the enactment of
FOIA in an effort to end the policy of obstructionism that section 3
permitted.34 Considered “a momentous occasion,” the passage of FOIA made
the United States the third country in the world to enact such legislation.35
FOIA expanded access beyond just those “properly and directly concerned,”
public access to such aged and harmless materials as George Washington’s intelligence
methods and a Confederate general’s memoirs.
HERBERT N. FOERSTEL, FREEDOM OF INFORMATION AND THE RIGHT TO KNOW: THE ORIGINS
AND APPLICATIONS OF THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT 36 (1999); see also Halstuk
& Chamberlin, supra note 21, at 522 (“[T]he APA contained numerous caveats and loopholes
that federal agencies routinely exploited to block public access to their records.”).
28. S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79 (1973) (stating
that the public-disclosure section of the APA was “generally recognized as falling far short of its
disclosure goals”), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a),
§ 552(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)). Congress also recognized
that the statute was “full of loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the
public.” S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3.
29. Kenneth D. Salomon & Lawrence H. Wechsler, Note, The Freedom of Information
Act: A Critical Review, 38 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 150, 151 (1969).
30. Id.; see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 5 (“The Administrative Procedure Act provides
no adequate remedy to members of the public to force disclosures . . . .”); S. REP. NO. 89-813, at
5 (“There is no remedy in case of wrongful withholding of information from citizens by
Government officials.”).
31. Martin E. Halstuk, When Secrecy Trumps Transparency: Why the OPEN Government
Act of 2007 Falls Short, 16 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 427, 435 (2008) (citing Exec. Order No.
10,290, 3 C.F.R. 789, 790 (1949–1953)).
32. Id. at 434–35.
33. Act of July 4, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250, 251 (codified as amended at 5
U.S.C. § 552 (2006)).
34. See K LOSEK, supra note 25, at 14 (explaining that FOIA was enacted after a push for a
more comprehensive law to replace the failed section 3).
35. Id.; see also FOERSTEL, supra note 27, at 44 (describing FOIA as “trailblazing
legislation”).
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and instead permits any person to obtain information from the government.36
In contrast with section 3, FOIA requires agency disclosure by default,37 only
permitting agencies to withhold information covered under one of the nine
specific exemptions.38 More importantly, FOIA created a system of judicial
review, giving members of the public a forum in which they can voice their
claims.39
Despite FOIA’s benefits, agencies implemented the Act reluctantly.40 Much
to the disappointment of the law’s proponents, agencies did not immediately
embrace FOIA’s underlying policies of open government and disclosure. 41
Eventually in 1972, Congress acknowledged FOIA’s deficiencies 42 and
amended the Act in 1974.43 Congress has since amended FOIA five times:
revising the exemptions in 1976 and 1986, 44 updating FOIA in 1996 in
response to the growth in Internet usage and electronically available
36. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3)(A); see also S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (stating that “the
public as a whole has a right to know what its Government is doing”).
37. 110 AM. JUR. TRIALS Litigation Under the Freedom of Information Act § 2 (2008)
(“Under FOIA, agencies of the federal government have a duty to fully disclose any and all
records unless such information is subject to one of the specific nine statutory exemptions . . . .”).
38. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)–(9) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (specifying the nine exemptions
that permit withholding information).
39. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973) (“[FOIA] seeks to
permit access to official information long shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts
to create a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from possibly unwilling
official hands.”), superseded by statute, Act of Nov. 21, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-502, sec. 2(a),
§ 552(b)(1), 88 Stat. 1561, 1563 (amending 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970)).
40. H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8 (1972); see also FOERSTEL, supra note 27, at 44, 71
(explaining how, despite public support for FOIA and its policy of broad disclosure, opposition
by the federal bureaucracy and executive resistance impeded the Act’s success).
41. See Halstuk, supra note 31, at 444 (noting that the years immediately following FOIA’s
enactment were disappointing); see also Antonin Scalia, The Freedom of Information Act Has No
Clothes, REG.: AEI J. GOV’T & SOC’Y, Mar.–Apr. 1982, at 14, reprinted in FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION 117 (Robert G. Vaughn ed., 2000) (describing how agencies resisted FOIA by
delaying responses for documents, replying with arbitrary denials, and overclassifying
documents).
42. See H.R. REP. NO. 92-1419, at 8 (describing the operation of FOIA as “hindered by 5
years of foot-dragging by the Federal bureaucracy,” and the bureaucracy’s “widespread
reluctance . . . to honor the public’s legal right to know”).
43. See Act of Nov. 21, 1974, 88 Stat. at 1561; see also Halstuk, supra note 31, at 445
(describing how the political climate in 1974 provided an appropriate time period to reform FOIA
in light of President Richard Nixon’s Watergate scandal). Congress’s primary changes to FOIA
involved modifications of Exemption 1, covering national-security information, and Exemption
7, covering law enforcement. Halstuk, supra note 31, at 446 (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1), (7)
(2006)). These changes were necessary “because both [exemptions] contained overbroad
language that led to arbitrary enforcement and made it possible for agencies to justify withholding
decisions,” inconsistent with Congress’s intent. Id.
44. Freedom of Information Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, secs. 1801–1804,
§ 552(a), (b)(7), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-48 to -50 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552);
Government in the Sunshine Act, Pub. L. No. 94-409, § 3(a), 90 Stat. 1241, 1242 (1976) (codified
as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010)).
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information, 45 attempting to streamline the FOIA request process in 2007,46
and revising Exemption 3 in 2009.47
C. Exemption 4: Trade Secrets and Commercial or Financial Information
Exemption 4 exempts from disclosure information that includes “trade
secrets and commercial or financial information obtained from a person and
privileged or confidential.”48 The D.C. Circuit has defined a trade secret as a
“secret, commercially valuable plan, formula, process, or device that is used
for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of trade commodities
and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or substantial
effort.” 49 This definition implies that the trade-secret information must be
directly related to the productive process.50
Exemption 4’s second clause covering “commercial or financial
information” has caused much confusion among courts and scholars.51 This
clause only exempts “information which is (a) commercial or financial, (b)
obtained from a person, and (c) privileged or confidential.” 52 If the
information is not a trade secret, then all three of these elements must be
45. See Electronic Freedom of Information Act Amendments of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-231,
§§ 1–11, 110 Stat. 3048, 3048–54 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2006 & Supp. III
2009)). These amendments clarified that FOIA applied to electronic and digitized information.
Halstuk, supra note 31, at 454. Additionally, they provided easier public access by requiring
agencies to make available on the Internet commonly requested information such as “agency
annual reports, statements of agency rules and policy, agency adjudicative opinions, and FOIA
handbooks.” Id.
46. See OPEN Government Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-175, 121 Stat. 2524, 2524 (“To
promote accessibility, accountability, and openness in Government . . . .”).
47. OPEN FOIA Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-83, sec. 64, § 552(b)(3), 123 Stat. 2141,
2184 (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. IV 2010)).
48. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(4). Notably, this language denotes only two categories of exempt
information: (1) trade secrets and (2) commercial or financial information that is both obtained
from a person and privileged or confidential. See Kenneth Culp Davis, The Information Act: A
Preliminary Analysis, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 787–88 (1967). Although it is possible to view
“commercial or financial information obtained from any person” and “privileged or confidential”
as distinct categories, such an interpretation stretches the language and does violence to the
statute. Id. (“Congress could not have intended to exempt all commercial or financial information
obtained from any person.”); see also Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280,
1286 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (interpreting Exemption 4 to require proof of confidentiality when
attempting to withhold commercial information that does not constitute trade secrets).
49. Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1288.
50. Id.
51. See, e.g., Davis, supra note 48, at 787 (referring to Exemption 4 as “probably the most
troublesome provision in the Act”); Note, Freedom of Information: The Statute and The
Regulations, 58 GEO. L.J. 18, 34 (1967) (“Exemption (b)(4) is probably the most confusing of the
nine.”); Exemption 4, Freedom of Information Act Guide, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (May 2004),
http://www.justice.gov/oip/exemption4.htm (stating that the “overwhelming bulk of Exemption 4
cases focus on whether the withheld information” falls with its second, much larger category).
52. Getman v. NLRB, 450 F.2d 670, 673 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (quoting Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp. 796, 802 (S.D.N.Y. 1969)).
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satisfied for Exemption 4 to apply.53 The interpretation of each element has
evolved from both FOIA’s legislative history and judicial interpretation.54
1. Commercial or Financial Information
Neither FOIA’s statutory language, nor its legislative history defines
“commercial” or “financial.”55 Consequently, courts have used the ordinary
meaning of the terms when conducting Exemption 4 analysis. 56 However,
even after adopting the ordinary meaning of “commercial,” courts have failed
to provide a clear definition of what that term means.57 Although the Senate
and House reports offer examples of commercial or financial information, such
as “business sales statistics, inventories, customer lists, scientific or
manufacturing processes or developments, and negotiation positions or
requirements in the case of labor-management mediations,” the reports provide
no bright-line definition. 58 Therefore, information is evaluated on a
case-by-case basis, rather than using a clear formula.59
2. Obtained from a Person
The APA, although not using language like “commercial or financial,” did
provide a definition of “person,” which applies to Exemption 4’s requirement
that information be “obtained from a person.” 60 Courts have broadly
interpreted this phrase in conjunction with “commercial or financial
information,” 61 and have concluded that the exemption is not limited to
commercial or financial information about the provider of the information;
rather, it extends to protect such information about a third party even where the
53. Id.
54. See infra Part I.C.1-3.
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 551 (2006 & Supp. IV 2010) (defining terms applicable to § 552); see
also Davis, supra note 48, at 789 (commenting that the legislative history fails to explain the use
of the terms “commercial” or “financial”).
56. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1983); Wash. Post Co. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 690 F.2d 252, 266 (D.C. Cir.
1982); see also Bd. of Trade of Chi. v. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 627 F.2d 392, 403
(D.C. Cir. 1980); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863, 870 (2d Cir. 1978).
57. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1290 (finding that information
can qualify as commercial if the provider of the information has a “commercial interest” in it).
58. H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966); see also S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965).
59. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp., 704 F.2d at 1290 (finding that health and
safety information regarding a person’s products is commercial because it is “instrumental in
gaining market approval” for the products); Dow Jones Co. v. FERC, 219 F.R.D. 167, 176 (C.D.
Cal. 2002) (noting upon review of the business information submitted by the defendant that
information relating to “business decisions and practices regarding the sale of power” was
commercial); Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Exp.-Imp. Bank, 108 F. Supp. 2d 19, 28–29 (D.D.C. 2000)
(holding export-insurance applications to be commercial).
60. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(2) (“‘[P]erson’ includes an individual, partnership, corporation,
association, or public or private organization other than an agency.”).
61. See, e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chi., 627 F.2d at 405.
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government obtained the information from someone other than that third
party.62
3. Privileged or Confidential
Determining whether the information at issue is privileged or confidential is
the most challenging element of Exemption 4.63 Unlike the other components,
FOIA’s legislative history informs the meaning of “confidential” and
“privileged.”64 As revealed in the language of the Senate and House reports,
Congress envisioned two primary situations in which Exemption 4 protects
confidential information: (1) where the government has promised to keep the
information confidential, and (2) where the information customarily would not
be made public.65
a. Promises of Confidentiality
In 1969, the Ninth Circuit dealt with the first situation—promises of
confidentiality—in General Services Administration v. Benson.66 The district
court held that Exemption 4 applies to information that an individual desires to
62. Id. In Board of Trade of City of Chicago v. Commodity Futures Trading Commission,
the D.C. Circuit rejected the Board of Trade’s argument that Exemption 4 was limited to
commercial or financial information that was obtained from the Trading Commission, which was
the “source of the information.” Id. The D.C. Circuit noted that the legislative history was
“sufficiently broad to encompass financial and commercial information concerning a third party,”
and there was no indication that Congress meant to limit the exemption to the extent urged by the
Board of Trade. Id.
63. See Exemption 4, Freedom of Information Act Guide, supra note 51 (“By far, most
Exemption 4 litigation has focused on whether or not requested information is
‘confidential’ . . . .”).
64. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965); see also H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497, at 10 (1966).
These two reports are the most instructive in regard to legislative history and are relied on
extensively. See Davis, supra note 48, at 762 (“[P]robably more than ninety-five per cent of the
useful legislative history is found in a ten page Senate committee report and in a fourteen page
House committee report.” (citing H.R. Rep. No. 89-1497 at 10; S. REP. NO. 89-813 at 9)). The
Senate report provides little insight into confidentiality except for explaining that the exemption
protects information “which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from
whom it was obtained.” S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9. However, the House report elaborated further
that it exempts “information which is given to an agency in confidence.” H.R. REP. NO. 89-1497,
at 10. The House report added that “where the Government has obligated itself in good faith not
to disclose documents or information which it receives, it should be able to honor such
obligations.” Id. Both reports identify privileged information as information that is “customarily
subject to the doctor-patient, lawyer-client, lender-borrower, and other such privileges.” S. REP.
NO. 89-813, at 9 (providing as an example any commercial, technical, and financial data provided
by a person seeking a loan to a lending agency in connection with a loan); see also H.R. REP. NO.
89-1497, at 10.
65. See supra note 64.
66. 415 F.2d 878, 881 (9th Cir. 1969). A partnership, of which Benson was a member,
purchased property from the General Services Administration (GSA). Id. Benson requested
records from the transaction, which the GSA refused to disclose based on several FOIA
exemptions, including Exemption 4. Id.
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keep confidential, and only provides “under the express or implied promise by
the government that the information will be kept confidential.”67 The Ninth
Circuit agreed with the district court’s reasoning and affirmed its decision.68
b. Not Customarily Released to the Public
The D.C. Circuit has decided the leading cases regarding the second
situation—information that is customarily not released to the public. 69 In
Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, the D.C. Circuit held that that the information was
confidential because it was of the type “which would customarily not be
released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.”70
The U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia adopted a more narrow
interpretation of confidentiality in M.A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC.71 The court
maintained that Exemption 4 requires more than a “bare claim of
confidentiality” by the provider of the information or the agency seeking to
withhold the information.72 Rather, courts have a duty to independently assess
a purported claim of confidentiality to determine objectively whether the
information at issue is of the type that an individual would not customarily
reveal to the public.73 The court synthesized two prior holdings of the D.C.
Circuit to suggest that allowing agencies to withhold information based on
67. Benson v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 289 F. Supp. 590, 594 (W.D. Wash. 1968), aff’d, 415
F.2d at 878.
68. Gen. Servs. Admin., 415 F.2d at 881–82.
69. See Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (agreeing with the
district court’s assessment that the documents concerning business sales would customarily not be
released to the public, and were therefore exempt from disclosure); see also Nat’l Parks
& Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (explaining that although the
determination of whether information would customarily be released to the public is an important
inquiry for determining when information is confidential, it is not the only inquiry); Critical Mass
Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (applying the National Parks two-part
inquiry).
70. Sterling Drug, 450 F.2d at 709 (quoting S. REP. NO 89-813, at 9 (1965)). Sterling Drug
sought documents related to a competitor’s acquisition of a company after the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) had challenged Sterling Drug’s attempted acquisition of another company, a
merger which Sterling Drug thought to be similar in nature to its competitor’s acquisition. Id. at
701–02. Sterling Drug sought detailed documents related to its competitor’s purchase of the
recently acquired company, and brought suit following the FTC’s nondisclosure of certain
documents. Id. at 702.
71. M. A. Schapiro & Co. v. SEC, 339 F. Supp. 467, 470–71 (D.D.C. 1972). The plaintiff
requested a Securities and Exchange (SEC) study and all documents the agency received during
its investigation related to the study. Id. at 468–69. The SEC refused to disclose the information
on Exemption 4 grounds, arguing for the protection of the privacy interests of those who provided
the information. Id. at 469. The SEC also argued that the information requested was exempt
under Exemptions 3, 5, 7, and 8. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3), (5), (7), (8) (2006 & Supp. IV
2010).
72. M. A. Schapiro & Co., 339 F. Supp. at 470 (quoting Bristol-Myers Co. v. FTC, 424 F.2d
935, 938 (D.C. 1970)).
73. Id. at 470–71.
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unchecked assertions of confidentiality would create serious potential for
abuse.74
c. The National Parks Test: A Two-Part Confidentiality Analysis
In 1974, the D.C. Circuit significantly altered its confidentiality analysis
through its holding in National Parks & Conservation Association v. Morton.75
Breaking from its holding in Sterling Drug, the D.C. Circuit held that
determining confidentiality required more than merely assessing whether the
provider of the information would disclose that information to the public.76
The court found that, to satisfy judicial scrutiny, the withholding of
information must comport with the legislative intent underlying whichever
exemption is at issue.77 The court noted that altogether the exemptions serve
two purposes: (1) protecting the interests of the government in efficiency, and
(2) protecting the interests of persons providing information in maintaining
confidentiality.78 The court distinguished between two separate interests that
FOIA exemptions were created to protect: those of the federal government, and
those of the people who had provided information to the government. 79
Notably, Exemption 4 has the “dual purpose” of protecting both interests,
whereas other exemptions usually only serve one.80
Following a thorough examination of FOIA’s legislative history, the D.C.
Circuit created a two-part test for evaluating confidentiality under Exemption 4
to ensure that these twin interests are properly protected:
74. Id. at 471 (citing Grumman Aircraft Eng’g Corp. v. Renegotiation Bd., 425 F.2d 578,
582 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Bristol-Myers Co., 424 F.2d at 938). In Grumman, the D.C. Circuit ordered
that the district court review the documents at issue to determine whether they contain
information that the provider would not reveal to the public. Grumman, 425 F.2d at 582. In
Bristol-Myers Co., the D.C. Circuit similarly ordered that the district court review the documents
at issue because FOIA “does not permit a bare claim of confidentiality” and the courts have “the
responsibility of determining the validity and extent of the claim.” Bristol-Myers Co., 424 F.2d at
938.
75. 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974). National Parks is the leading case concerning
Exemption 4 issues. See OSHA Data/CIH, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 162 n.24
(3d Cir. 2000). The National Parks and Conservation Association (Association) requested
information regarding concession operations from the Director of the National Park Service.
Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 351 F. Supp. 404, 405 (D.D.C. 1972), rev’d, 498
F.2d at 771. The Park Service released the majority of the requested information, but refused to
release audit and other financial information related to several businesses operating concessions
within the national parks. Id. The Association then brought suit to compel the release of the
information, but the Park Service maintained that it had properly withheld the information under
Exemption 4. Id. at 405–06. Because both parties agreed that the information was financial,
obtained from a person, and not privileged, the only question before the court was whether the
information was confidential. Id. at 406.
76. Nat’l Parks, 498 F.2d at 767.
77. Id.
78. Id. (citing S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965)).
79. Id.
80. Id.
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[C]ommercial or financial matter is “confidential” for purposes of
the exemption if disclosure of the information is likely to have either
of the following effects: (1) to impair the Government’s ability to
obtain necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial
harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the
information was obtained.81
The two-part test, which has become known as the “National Parks test,” has
been used by the majority of circuit courts.82 However, legal scholars have
criticized the test as being inconsistent with the language and the legislative
intent of Exemption 4, which confine the intended analysis to whether the
information would be customarily released to the public.83
d. Critical Mass Categories: Continued Availability and Reliability
The D.C. Circuit refined the National Parks test in Critical Mass Energy
Project v. NRC. 84 Petitioned to reconsider the National Parks holding, the
D.C. Circuit determined that the NRC had failed to overcome the principle of
stare decisis when arguing for the abandonment of the National Parks test.85
The court cited three reasons supporting its refusal to overturn National

81. Id. at 770 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). The court recognized that the first part
protects the governmental interest because “unless persons having necessary information can be
assured that it will remain confidential, they may decline to cooperate with officials and the
ability of the Government to make intelligent, well informed decisions will be impaired.” Id.
The second part protects the private interest of those providing information who would
experience competition disadvantages if financial or commercial data was made public. Id. at
768.
82. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Pac.
Architects & Eng’rs Inc. v. Dep’t of State, 906 F.2d 1345, 1347 (9th Cir. 1990); Anderson v.
Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 907 F.2d 936, 946 (10th Cir. 1990); Acumenic Research &
Tech. v. Dep’t of Justice, 843 F.2d 800, 807 (4th Cir. 1988); Sharyland Water Supply Corp. v.
Block, 755 F.2d 397, 398–99 (5th Cir. 1985); Gen. Elec. Co. v. NRC, 750 F.2d 1394, 1402–03
(7th Cir. 1984); 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve
Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 7–10 (1st Cir. 1983); Am. Airlines, Inc., v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 588 F.2d 863,
871 (2d Cir. 1978).
83. See, e.g., Richard L. Rainey, Stare Decisis and Statutory Interpretation: An Argument
for a Complete Overruling of the National Parks Test, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1430, 1468–71
(1993) (arguing not only that the National Parks test has no statutory basis, but positing that
statutory language and congressional intent clearly show that the “would not be customarily
released” test is the appropriate analysis); see also Thomas L. Patten & Kenneth W. Weinstein,
Disclosure of Business Secrets Under the Freedom of Information Act: Suggested Limitations, 29
ADMIN. L. REV. 193, 196 (1977) (“It is probably accurate to say that Congress did not have
anything like the National Parks I test for confidentiality in mind when that term was inserted.”).
84. 975 F.2d at 880. Critical Mass Energy Project (Critical Mass), a nonprofit organization,
requested from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) reports, which the NRC refused to
disclose. Id. at 872. The NRC claimed Exemption 4 protection applied because the NRC had
received the reports from a separate business, the Institute of Nuclear Power Operations, on the
condition that the reports be kept confidential. Id.
85. Id. at 875–76.
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Parks: (1) the “widespread acceptance” of the test in other circuits, 86 (2)
Congress’s recognition of the test’s appropriateness in subsequent legislation,87
and (3) the “workability” of the test in practice.88 Although it did not find the
test problematic enough to overturn precedent, the court acknowledged that
applying the test has its difficulties.89 Thus, the court felt it could “greatly
simplify the application of Exemption 4 in a significant number of cases”90 by
confining application of National Parks to information that the provider was
required by law or otherwise to submit to the government.91 For voluntarily
provided information, Exemption 4 would still apply if the provider would not
customarily release it to the public.92
The D.C. Circuit left the National Parks test intact regarding compelled
information, but the court recognized an additional consideration affecting the
governmental interest protected by the first part of the National Parks test.93
Although disclosure of information might not impair the government’s ability
to obtain information in the future when production of the information is
mandatory, disclosure could negatively impact the quality of information
because persons fearing disclosure might provide less reliable information.94
Because the first part of the National Parks test protects the government’s
ability to obtain necessary information for efficient operation,95 protecting the
continued reliability of compelled information is implicit in the test.96 In other
words, the court realized that the routine disclosure of compelled information
could lead individuals and businesses to provide false or unreliable data in an
86. Id. at 876 (citing decisions from seven different circuits that accept the National Parks
test).
87. Id. at 876 (citing CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1152–53 & n.146 (D.C.
Cir. 1987) (citing 5 U.S.C. § 552b (2006)). In the legislative history of the § 552(b)
open-meeting rules, Congress acquiesced to the National Parks test as the appropriate standard
for interpreting the confidentiality exemption under that section, which protects Exemption 4. See
Donovan, 830 F.2d at 1152–53 & n.146.
88. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 877. The court observed that the precedent will be adhered to
so long as it does not amount to “a ‘positive detriment to coherence and consistency in the law’ or
a ‘direct obstacle to the realization of important objectives embodied in other laws.’” Id. (quoting
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 173 (1989), superseded by statute, Civil Rights
Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166 § 3(a), 105 Stat. 1071).
89. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 877.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 880.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 878.
94. Id.
95. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
96. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878; see also 9 to 5 Org. for Women Office Workers v.
Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 721 F.2d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 1983) (finding that the
National Parks test was intended to protect the government’s ability to “make intelligent, well
informed decisions”—an intention that the “necessary information implies (quoting Ntn’l Parks
& Conservation Ass’n v. Marton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
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effort to protect themselves from the repercussions of an agency’s
disclosures.97
Regarding the application of Exemption 4 to information voluntarily
provided to the government, the court reverted to an earlier understanding of
“confidential.” 98 Returning to Sterling Drug, the court held that voluntarily
provided information will be deemed confidential if it “would customarily not
be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained.” 99
Whereas the government’s interest in exempting compelled information is
continued reliability of the information it receives, the government’s interest in
exempting voluntary information is ensuring that persons continue to make
such information available to the government. 100 Criticism once again
followed the D.C. Circuit’s decision.101 Although eight circuits have accepted
the National Parks test, not one has incorporated the Critical Mass categorical
approach—choosing instead to defer the issue.102
D. The Public Domain: When Do Agencies Waive The Exemptions?
Asserting an exemption is not always successful, even when an exemption
may appear to be applicable. An agency’s prior disclosure of the information
may waive the protection under a FOIA exemption.103 Black’s Law Dictionary
defines waiver as “the voluntary relinquishment or abandonment of a legal
right.”104 Courts have held that a prior disclosure waives an exemption only
97. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
98. See supra Part I.C.3.b. Compare id. at 879 (finding “that financial or commercial
information provided to the Government on a voluntary basis is ‘confidential’ . . . if it is of a kind
that would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was obtained),
with Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC, 450 F.2d 698, 709 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (holding that information
“which would customarily not be released to the public by the person from whom it was
obtained” qualified as “confidential” for the purposes of Exemption 4 (quoting S. REP. NO.
89-813, at 9 (1965))).
99. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 879; see also infra note 108.
100. Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
101. See, e.g., Scott Raber, Reinventing a Less Vigorous Freedom of Information Act: The
Aftermath of Critical Mass Energy Project v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 1994 ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 79, 109 (1994) (commenting that the legislative history of Exemption 4 never
distinguished between voluntary and involuntary submissions); G. Branch Taylor, Comment, The
Critical Mass Decision: A Dangerous Blow to Exemption 4 Litigation, 2 COMMLAW
CONSPECTUS 133, 143 (1996) (concluding that through Critical Mass the D.C. Circuit has created
a new loophole for agencies to withhold more information from the public).
102. See, e.g., Wickwire Gavin, P.C. v. U.S. Postal Serv., 356 F.3d 588, 597 (4th Cir. 2004)
(declining to decide whether Critical Mass applies); see also OSHA DATA/CIH, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Labor, 220 F.3d 153, 166 n.30 (3d Cir. 2000); Frazee v. U.S. Forest Serv., 97 F.3d 367, 372 (9th
Cir. 1996); Nadler v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. 92 F.3d 93, 96 n.1 (2d Cir. 1996).
103. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015–16 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(stating that the extent to which prior agency disclosure constitutes waiver depends on the
circumstances and the exemption that is claimed).
104. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1717 (9th ed. 2009). The same definition applies in the
context of waiving protection under FOIA exemptions. See, e.g., Fla. House of Representatives
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for those documents that were already disclosed. 105 Moreover, whether an
agency’s prior disclosure waives an exemption requires a case-by-case analysis
dependent on the factual circumstances of the case and the specific exemptions
implicated. 106 Once the agency has met its burden of proof satisfying a
particular exemption, the burden shifts to the party seeking disclosure to prove
that the exemption has been waived by a prior disclosure and the exemption
can no longer serve its purpose.107
The public-domain test—the prevailing test for determining waiver of FOIA
exemptions—focuses on whether the information had already entered the
public domain when the agency attempted to withhold it. 108 To be in the
public domain, the information must have been disclosed in a permanent
public record. 109 Additionally, the prior agency disclosure in a permanent

v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 961 F.2d 941, 946 (11th Cir. 1992) (applying the same definition
when determining whether the Secretary of Commerce waived protection under Exemption 4).
The court subsequently found no waiver because the disclosure was involuntary. Id.
105. See, e.g., Mobil Oil Corp. v. EPA, 879 F.2d 698, 701 (9th Cir. 1989) (“[T]he release of
certain documents waives FOIA exemptions only for those documents released.”); see also
Salisbury v. United States, 690 F.2d 966, 971 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“[D]isclosure of a similar type of
information in a different case does not mean the agency must make its disclosure in every
case.”).
106. Carson, 631 F.2d at 1015–16 & n.30.
107. See Afshar v. Dep’t of State, 702 F.2d 1125, 1130 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (requiring the party
asserting a prior disclosure claim to highlight the specific information that duplicates the
information being withheld); see also Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 554 (D.C. Cir. 1999)
(“Under our public-domain doctrine, materials normally immunized from disclosure under FOIA
lose their protective cloak once disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record.”).
108. See, e.g., Herrick v. Garvey, 298 F.3d 1184, 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (“Waiver doctrine
stands for the proposition that the government cannot rely on an otherwise valid exemption [to
FOIA] to justify withholding information that has been officially acknowledged or is in the public
domain.” (alteration in original) (quoting Davis v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 968 F.2d 1276, 1279
(D.C. Cir. 1992)) (internal quotation marks ommitted)); Students Against Genocide v. Dep’t of
State, 257 F.3d 828, 836 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (stating that the government may not rely on a FOIA
exemption if the information is in the public domain); Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554–55 (applying the
public-domain test to a withholding under Exemption 3); Davis, 968 F.2d at 1279–80
(acknowledging that the public-domain test applies to determining if waiver occurred);
Fitzgibbon v. CIA, 911 F.2d 755, 765 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (explaining that disclosure is required
despite an otherwise valid exemption claim when the specific information has already been made
public in an official document (citing Afshar, 707 F.2d at 1130)); CNA Fin. Corp. v. Donovan,
830 F.2d 1132, 1154 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (“To the extent that any data requested under FOIA are in
the public domain, the submitter is unable to make any claim to confidentiality—a sine qua non
of Exemption 4.”); Afshar, 702 F.2d at 1130 (stating that the plaintiff must point to specific
information in the public domain to waive a FOIA exemption). This standard evinces that
whether an official disclosure has occurred determines what is in the public domain. See Nat’l
Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004) (noting that “once there is
disclosure, the information belongs to the general public”).
109. See Students Against Genocide, 257 F.3d at 836; Cottone, 193 F.3d at 554; Davis, 658
F.2d at 1279–80.
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public record must have been an official disclosure.110 Thus, absent an official
disclosure in a permanent public record, an agency will not have waived the
protection of a FOIA exemption. 111 For example, prior disclosure of
information to an opposing party in litigation in accordance with the law does
not constitute waiver so long as the information was not presented in open
court.112
E. The Ninth Circuit’s Departure From the Public-Domain Test: Can There
Truly Be Waiver When the Government Has Not Made an Official Disclosure
of Information to the Public?
1. Center for Auto Safety: Exemption 4 Is Not Waived by Limited
Disclosure
In 1997, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA)
requested information from nine automakers regarding the air-bag systems
installed in their vehicles.113 All manufacturers responded and the NHTSA
posted portions of the requested information on the Department of
Transportation’s website.114 In early 1999, the Center for Auto Safety (CAS)
submitted a FOIA request for the remaining air-bag system information that
NHTSA had not already made available online.115 The Agency first cited to
Exemption 4 and denied the entire request, but later released redacted reports

110. Compare Wolf v. CIA, 473 F.3d 370, 378 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (recognizing that the
particular information at issue must have been already disclosed to the public in an official
disclosure in order to constitute waiver), with Kimberlin v. Dep’t of Justice, 139 F.3d 944, 949
(D.C. Cir. 1998) (determining that vague references to a conclusion of an investigation do not
constitute waiver). In Wolf v. CIA, the court found the congressional testimony of the CIA
director to be an official disclosure due to the public nature of the testimony. 473 F.3d at 379.
111. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, 802 F. Supp. 2d 185, 205–06
(D.D.C. 2011); see also Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2001);
Martin Marietta Corp. v. Dalton, 974 F. Supp. 37, 40 (D.D.C. 1997).
112. See Cottone, 193 F.3d at 556 (“[A] constitutionally compelled disclosure to a single
party simply does not enter the public domain.”); see also Jones v. FBI, 41 F.3d 238, 249–50 (6th
Cir. 1994) (noting that discoverability of certain information in litigation does not entitle a FOIA
plaintiff to disclosure of that information). In a recent Tenth Circuit decision, the court further
limited the public-domain test for waiver by permitting the withholding of certain information
presented in open court under Exemption 7. See Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S.
Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53 (10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 473 (2011). The
court held that the public-domain test only applies when the public disclosure renders the
applicable exemption ineffective at serving its purpose. Id. at 1253 (finding that exemption under
§ 552(b)(7)(C) could still serve its purpose of protecting the family’s privacy interests even after
the video and audio evidence were presented in open court).
113. Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 2
(D.D.C. 2000).
114. Id. at 2–3.
115. Id. at 3. The information CAS requested fell into six categories: “air bag deployment,
air bag cover, air bag system components, seatbelts, crash sensors, and system performance.” Id.
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to CAS after an administrative appeal. 116 CAS then filed suit in the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia in an effort to compel production of
the redacted information.117
All manufacturers who provided the information to the NHTSA intervened
in the case before the district court and argued that Exemption 4 protected the
requested information for two reasons: the information constituted trade secrets
and it was confidential commercial information obtained by a person.118 In
addressing the confidential-commercial-information prong of Exemption 4, the
court followed Critical Mass by analyzing whether the parties had voluntarily
provided the information to the government or if production had been
compelled by the NHTSA.119 Under the voluntary prong, Exemption 4 would
protect the information if it was “not customarily disclosed to the public.”120
In explaining the Critical Mass holding, the court went on to note that
determining whether information is customarily disclosed is an objective
analysis that “allows the submitter to make protected disclosures of the
information, provided that such disclosures are not made to the general
public.” 121 Under the mandatory prong, originally developed in National
Parks, Exemption 4 would protect the information if it was not customarily
disclosed to the public and disclosure would impair the government’s ability to
obtain the information in the future or would cause substantial harm to the
competitive position of the person who provided the information.122
The main debate between CAS and the automakers turned on whether the
information at issue was confidential. 123 The district court held that the
information was voluntarily submitted to the NHTSA; thus, the information
could be considered confidential if it was not customarily disclosed to the
public.124 The court went on to note that “[l]imited disclosures, such as to
suppliers or employees, do not preclude protection under Exemption 4, as long
as those disclosures are not made to the general public.”125 Although CAS
attempted to argue that the information had been disclosed in other
materials,126 the court made clear that the past “discrete disclosures to persons
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 14, 16.
119. Id. at 9.
120. Id.; see also Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
121. Center for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp 2d at 10 (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880).
122. Id. (citing Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767, 770 (D.C.
Cir. 1974)); see also Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
123. Center for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp 2d at 16.
124. Id. at 16–17.
125. Id. at 17–18. (citing Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 880).
126. Id. at 18 (“Plaintiff’s . . . argument is that the manufacturers have revealed this
information in . . . service manuals, specifications sent to suppliers . . . , in litigation, in
publicly-available crash test films, in prior voluntary submissions to the NHTSA, and in press
releases, annual reports, and other . . . disclosures to the general public.”).
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or agencies who require[d] the information” were not customary disclosures
and typically included confidentiality notices; therefore, the past disclosure did
not establish that the information was no longer confidential.127
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit generally approved of the district court’s holding
regarding customary disclosure, but it found that the district court had
misapplied earlier precedent by mistakenly claiming that CAS could not obtain
disclosure unless it had proven that the information was customarily released
and identical information had been disclosed in the past.128 To correct this
error, the circuit court remanded the case to resolve remaining questions
regarding the customary disclosure of certain pieces of information, but
indicated that most of the district court’s holding would remain intact.129
2. Watkins: Exemption 4 Is Waived When No Limits Are Placed on a Prior
Disclosure
In Watkins v. United States Bureau of Customs & Border Protection, the
Ninth Circuit adopted a more liberal test for determining whether Exemption 4
had been waived. 130 Samuel Watkins, an intellectual-property attorney,
submitted eight FOIA requests to the U.S. Bureau of Customs and Border
Protection (CBP) for disclosure of notices of seizure of infringing merchandise
(notices)131 from several ports within the United States.132 When CBP seizes
goods bearing markings considered to infringe on registered trademarks, then
CBP will provide notices, which contain information generally kept
confidential, to the affected trademark owners only.133 CBP does this to give
trademark owners an opportunity to take expeditious action against the alleged
counterfeiter.134 Although the Agency only discloses this information to the

127. Id.
128. Id. at 151–52. The D.C. Circuit initiated its analysis by recognizing that the case was
not one of a “typical voluntary information submission” because the NHTSA did not have
authority to compel the automakers to provide the information requested. Ctr. for Auto Safety v.
Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 148 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The D.C. Circuit,
nonetheless, continued to analyze the case as one involving a voluntary disclosure to the NHTSA.
Id. at 150.
129. Id. at 152–53.
130. 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2011).
131. 19 C.F.R § 133.21(c) (2011) (requiring that notice be given to a trademark owner when
merchandise is seized at customs for infringement). These notices of seizure include the
following information: “(1) the date the merchandise was imported; (2) the port of entry; (3)
description of the merchandise; (4) quantity of the merchandise; (5) country of origin of the
merchandise; (6) name and address of the exporter; (7) name and address of the importer; and (8)
the name and address of the manufacturer.” Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192.
132. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192.
133. Id.
134. Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 58 Fed. Reg.
44,476, 44,476 (proposed Aug. 23, 1993); see also Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection;
Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed. Reg. 36,249, 36,250 (proposed July 14, 1995) (explaining the
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trademark owner, it places no condition or limit the trademark owner’s use or
distribution of the notices. 135 Watkins eventually received copies of the
notices,136 but CBP had heavily redacted them on the basis that Exemptions 2,
4, 6, and 7 applied.137
Watkins sued to obtain copies of the unredacted documents, arguing that
CBP had waived Exemption 4 by sending the notices to the trademark
owners.138 Both parties moved for summary judgment,139 and the district court
found in favor of CBP.140 The district court rejected Watkins’s argument that
purpose of this notification is to streamline trademark owners’ remedies in place of the
cumbersome FOIA procedure).
135. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–97.
136. Id. Watkins encountered several issues after submitting his original requests. Id. at
1192. Initially, he received no response or acknowledgement of the requests sent to several of the
ports. Id. Additionally, other ports required FOIA processing fees in advance, with some fee
totals reaching $30,000. Id. To reduce costs, Watkins modified his requests to cover a shorter
period of time. Id.
137. Id. at 1192–93. Exemption 2 covers information “related solely to the internal personal
rules and practices of an agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(2) (2006). Exemption 6 covers “personnel
and medical files and similar files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(6). Exemption 7 covers “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent that the production of such law
enforcement records or information (A) could reasonably be expected to interfere with
enforcement proceedings . . . [or] (C) could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy . . . .” Id. § 552(b)(7).
138. Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., No. CV08-1679JLR, 2009 WL
3633893, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Oct. 30, 2009), aff’d in part, 643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011).
139. Id. at *1. Summary judgment is proper when “there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and . . . the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” FED. R. CIV. P.
56(a). Indeed, “FOIA cases typically and appropriately are decided on motions for summary
judgment.” Defenders of Wildlife v. U.S. Border Patrol, 623 F. Supp. 2d 83, 87 (D.D.C. 2009).
Summary judgment in favor of nondisclosure is appropriate when the agency’s supportive
evidence describes “the documents and the justifications for nondisclosure with reasonably
specific detail, demonstrate[s] that the information withheld logically falls within the claimed
exemption, and [is] not controverted by either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of
agency bad faith.” Id. (quoting Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738 (D.C. Cir.
1981)). Generally, courts use a two-step inquiry to asses a motion for summary judgment in
FOIA cases: (1) “whether the agency has met its burden of proving that it fully discharged its
obligations under FOIA,” and (2) “whether the agency has proven that the information that it did
not disclose falls within one of the nine FOIA exemptions.” See L.A. Times Commc’ns, LLC v.
Dep’t of the Army, 442 F. Supp. 2d, 880, 893–94 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (citing 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(a)(4)(B) (2006); Zemansky v. EPA, 767 F.2d 569, 571 (9th Cir. 1985)).
140. Watkins, 2009 WL 3633893, at *1. Applying the Ninth Circuit’s test to determine the
applicability of Exemption 4, the court found consensus with regard to the satisfaction of the first
two elements of Exemption 4—“commercial or financial information” and “obtained from a
person.” Id. at *6. The heart of the dispute centered on whether the information was
“confidential.” Id. The district court recognizing that the Ninth Circuit had adopted the National
Parks test, and found that it controlled in this case. Id. at *7 (citing Frazec v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
97 F.3d 367, 371 (9th Cir. 1996); GC Micro Corp. v. Def. Logistics Agency, 33 F.3d 1109,
1112–13 (9th Cir. 1994)). Under the National Parks test, material is confidential if it is likely
either “(1) to impair the Government’s ability to obtain necessary information in the future; or (2)
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the disclosure of the notices to trademark owners constituted a waiver of
Exemption 4, holding instead that the “limited disclosure to interested
third-parties [did] not operate to disqualify the information from protection
under Exemption 4.”141
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court’s determination
that the notices were commercial and that Exemption 4 normally applies to
such notices.142 However, the court held that, in this case, “CBP waived the
confidentiality of the notices by disclosing them to trademark owners without
any limits on further dissemination.” 143 While acknowledging that the
public-domain test constituted one method of determining waiver of
confidentiality, the court concluded that it should not be the only test.144 The
court reasoned that the public-domain test did not adequately address the
concerns associated with the “no-strings-attached” disclosure because
information so disclosed might still be made widely available to the public
without being officially disclosed in a permanent public record.145 Thus, the
court created a new “unlimited disclosure” test, which provided that waiver
occurs when the government has disclosed information to any third party
without placing limits on that person’s ability to further distribute the
information.146
II. CENTER FOR AUTO SAFETY ADHERES TO PRECEDENT WHILE WATKINS IS A
MYSTERIOUS DEPARTURE
In Critical Mass, the D.C. Circuit outlined several factors to consider when
applying the principle of stare decisis to follow or abandon precedent.147 The
D.C. Circuit’s holding in Center for Auto Safety comports with precedent and
holds true to both the general purposes of FOIA, and the specific purposes of
Exemption 4.148 In contrast, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in Watkins is contrary
to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of the person from whom the information
was obtained.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Martin, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
The district court ruled that the information in the notices was confidential because disclosure
would create a risk of substantial competitive harm to the importers; therefore, the information
was exempt under Exemption 4. Watkins, 2009 WL 3633893, at *9–10.
141. Id. at *10. The court also noted that a statute required the limited disclosure, and
compliance therein did not constitute waiver. Id.
142. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195–96.
143. Id. at 1196.
144. Id. at 1197.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 1198.
147. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 875–76 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(describing when it is appropriate for a court to abandon established precedent). The D.C. Circuit
focused on the widespread acceptance of its National Parks test, the subsequent acquiescence by
Congress, and the lack of evidence to show that the test did not work. Id. at 867–77.
148. See supra Part I.D (recognizing the public-domain test as the prevailing test to
determine waiver of a FOIA exemption); infra Part II.A (arguing that Center for Auto Safety
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to prior case law and Exemption 4’s underlying intent.149 Additionally, none
of the factors considered by the D.C. Circuit in Critical Mass for observing
stare decisis were present or acknowledged in Watkins, rendering the Ninth
Circuit’s departure from the public-domain test unjustifiable.150
A. Center for Auto Safety: A Proper Use of the Waiver Doctrine
The D.C. Circuit’s Center for Auto Safety decision is well grounded in logic,
and the court’s reasoning accorded with other cases relying on the
public-domain test.151 Although the court did not explicitly acknowledge the
waiver doctrine or the public-domain test, both the district court and circuit
court opinions analyzed whether the information at issue was customarily
disclosed to the general public and whether prior limited disclosures of that
information waived exemption protection.152 CAS attempted to argue that the
automakers’ prior disclosures destroyed any claims of continuing
confidentiality, but the court disagreed, characterizing the releases as “discrete
disclosures to persons or agencies who require the information . . . [that had]
generally been accompanied by confidentiality agreements . . . .”153 Consistent
with other judicial precedent applying the public-domain test to find waiver
when information is officially disclosed in a permanent public record,154 the
D.C. Circuit correctly concluded that Exemption 4 protection still applied to
the air-bag system information and had not been waived by prior

accords with precedent). The underlying purpose of FOIA is to allow the general public to obtain
information from the government and to ensure that certain items are protected from disclosure.
See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 3 (1965) (acknowledging that despite the policy of broad disclosure,
some information should remain confidential); see also supra note 4 (describing Exemption 4 and
explaining that the public-domain test is the primary test for determining waiver).
149. See supra Part I.C–D; infra Part II.B (explaining why the Ninth Circuit decided Watkins
improperly).
150. Compare Critical Mass Energy Project, 975 F.2d at 876–77 (following the National
Parks test because it is widely accepted, Congress has acquiesced to the test, and it is workable),
with Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th Cir. 2011)
(concluding that the public-domain test should not be the only test for waiver).
151. See supra Part I.D (discussing the history of the waiver doctrine and the prevailing test
for waiver); supra Part I.E.1 (discussing the court’s holding in Center for Auto Safety). Although
Center for Auto Safety focused on the auto manufacturer’s past disclosures and Watkins focuses
on the agency’s disclosure, both equally focus on past disclosures and concern the continuing
confidentiality of the information at issue. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury,
802 F. Supp. 2d 185, 206 (D.D.C. 2011) (citing to Center for Auto Safety and applying the
limited-disclosure analysis to past disclosures by a government entity).
152. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144, 150
(D.C. Cir. 2001); see also Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F.
Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144.
153. Ctr. for Auto Safety, 93 F. Supp. 2d at 18.
154. See supra Part I.D.

828

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 61:807

disclosures.155 A recent D.C. district court case has echoed the Center for Auto
Safety holding by finding that no waiver occurred when information was
previously disclosed in a limited fashion.156
B. Watkins: An Improper Interpretation of the Waiver Doctrine
The Ninth Circuit’s use of the waiver doctrine to justify disclosure in
Watkins is problematic.157 The court’s expansion of the doctrine compels a
finding of a waiver whenever an agency freely discloses information to a
private party without restricting further dissemination of the information.158
Although the court considered whether the information qualified for
Exemption 4,159 it only briefly discussed its departure from prevailing waiver
doctrine. 160 The lack of detailed discussion regarding waiver doctrine is
peculiar given that the court’s holding broadened the waiver doctrine by

155. See Ctr. for Auto Safety, 244 F.3d at 152–53 (noting that the district court found that the
majority of the information at issue was not customarily disclosed in spite of earlier limited
disclosures).
156. See Judicial Watch, 802 F. Supp. 2d at 205–06.
157. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1196–98 (9th
Cir. 2011) (failing to follow the public-domain test when holding that a non-public disclosure to a
private third party waived any exemption).
158. Id. at 1197.
159. Id. at 1194–96 (discussing whether Exemption 4 applied to the notices). The court first
addressed whether the information was “commercial or financial.” Id. at 1194–95; see also supra
Part I.C.1 (discussing the “commercial or financial” prong of Exemption 4). Recognizing that
“commercial” and “financial” are to be given their ordinary meaning, the court readily dismissed
Watkins’s argument that the information was not commercial, as illegal dealings in counterfeits is
not a “legitimate commercial activity.” Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1194–95; see also Pub. Citizen
Health Research Grp. v. FDA, 704 F.2d 1280, 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (finding that information
can qualify as commercial if the provider of the information has a “commercial interest” in it).
The court found that the relevant inquiry is whether the importation of goods in general qualifies
as commercial because the seizure of goods was not a final determination that the goods were
actually counterfeit. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195. The notices contained plainly commercial
information, such as supply chains and demand fluctuation. Id. The second prong of Exemption
4 analysis was not in dispute, as indicated by a complete lack of discussion in the court’s opinion
regarding whether the information was “obtained from a person.” See id. at 1194–95; see also
supra Part I.C.2 (discussing the “obtained from a person” prong of Exemption 4). The second
prong was clearly satisfied because the information was obtained from an importing company,
which is included in the definition of “person.” Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195; see also 5 U.S.C.
§ 551(2) (2006). The final step for the court was applying the National Parks test to determine if
disclosure of the information is likely to either: “(1) impair the Government’s ability to obtain
necessary information in the future; or (2) to cause substantial harm to the competitive position of
the person from whom the information was obtained.” Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v.
Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 770 (D.C. Cir. 1974); see also supra Part I.C.3.c (discussing the National
Parks test). The Ninth Circuit limited the issue in Watkins to the second National Parks factor.
Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1194. The court found that CBP had demonstrated substantial harm because
the evidence established actual competition in the market for imports and the likelihood that
disclosure would risk substantial injury to the importers in that market. Id. at 1196.
160. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98.
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significantly departing from prevailing law. 161 The bulk of the court’s
reasoning focused on the potential for further disclosure by a third party, rather
than actual disclosure in the public domain.162 Accordingly, the court ruled
that as a “no-strings-attached disclosure,” the release of notices to trademark
owners constituted waiver.163
Contrary to the court’s decision, a review of the circumstances surrounding
the disclosure in Watkins demonstrates that the notices provided to private
parties do not in fact qualify as disclosures to the public so as to constitute a
waiver. 164 Instead, the release of the notices is a limited disclosure, made
pursuant to a statute that requires notice be provided only to legitimate
trademark owners whose intellectual property has been potentially infringed so
that they can take action against the counterfeiters if they so desire.165 The
disclosure in Watkins is remarkably similar to the disclosure in Center for Auto
Safety in that the release in Watkins was limited to only “certain parties at
interest,” rather than the public as a whole.166 Although the Watkins court
focused on the potential for further dissemination of the notices due to the lack
of confidentiality restrictions—a concern not at issue in Center for Auto
Safety—there was still no “permanent public record” of the notices disclosed.
This determination should end the inquiry when waiver doctrine is correctly
applied.167
Characterizing the notices as an official disclosure runs contrary to what
other courts have recognized as official disclosures in other circumstances.168
Although the Ninth Circuit attempted to distinguish Watkins from cases
protecting limited disclosure from the waiver doctrine because of the
“overriding concerns for public safety and national security,”169 the court made
no mention of prior case law in which the public-domain test was used in the
context of Exemption 4. 170 Much like the information released in Judicial
161. See id.
162. Id. at 1196–97 (“[The third party] can freely disseminate that information in ways that
would compromise the purportedly sensitive information . . . .” (emphasis added)).
163. Id. at 1197.
164. See supra Part I.D (discussing the prevailing waiver test of whether information can be
found in the public domain).
165. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006)); see also supra note 152
and accompanying text.
166. Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed. Reg.
36,249, 36,250 (proposed July 14, 1995) (noting that the seizure notices were to be provided “to
certain parties at interest”); see also Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192 (explaining that the information is
only provided to the owner of the potentially infringed trademark); Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l
Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d 1, 18 (D.D.C. 2000), rev’d in part on other
grounds, 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
167. See supra Part I.D.
168. See supra note 110.
169. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197.
170. See infra note 180.
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Watch, the notices provided to trademark owners are similarly intended to keep
interested parties apprised of information that concerns them.171 As the court
recognized, requiring disclosure of the information in the notices under FOIA
could cause the trademark owners the substantial competitive harm that
Exemption 4 was intended to prevent.172 The limited disclosure of information
relating to the seizure of allegedly counterfeit goods should not require
universal disclosure of the confidential and commercial or financial
information contained in the notices. 173 The Agency did not distribute the
notices in the public domain because they were not officially disclosed in a
permanent public record; thus, protection from disclosure was not waived
under the traditional understanding of the waiver doctrine. 174 The Ninth
Circuit’s departure from past precedent could not have been anticipated by
CBP. As such, CBP had no notice that their “no limits” disclosure to
trademark owners would constitute waiver when the existing requirements of
the public-domain test were not satisfied.175
Not only does the Watkins decision contradict the law in other circuits, but it
conflicts with the Ninth Circuit’s previous holding in Bowen v. Food & Drug
Administration, in which the court asserted that an agency’s prior disclosure
does not necessarily waive future claims of exemption for information related
to the disclosed information.176 The Watkins opinion does not mention Bowen
in its waiver analysis, only briefly citing to the case in a general discussion of
Exemption 4, and fails to acknowledge Bowen’s concern about the
government’s ability to obtain information in the future if the documents
requested were disclosed.177 In Bowen, the Agency placed no restrictions on
the information that had been released, just as the Agency in Watkins placed no
restrictions on the trademark owners regarding further dissemination. 178

171. See Copyright/Trademark/Trade Name Protection; Disclosure of Information, 60 Fed.
Reg. at 36,250.
172. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196.
173. Compare Cottone v. Reno, 193 F.3d 550, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (finding no waiver for
wiretapped recordings that were only provided to counsel and not played in open court), with
Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1192 (stating that the information in the notices remains confidential except
when disclosed to only those trademark owners whose trademarks may have been infringed).
174. See supra Part I.D (discussing the public-domain test and explaining that it is the
prevailing test for waiver); see also Cottone, 193 F.3d at 555 (stating that the court “must be
confident that the information sought is truly public and that the requester receive no more than
what is publicly available before [it] find[s] a waiver”).
175. Thus, although there was no confidentiality agreement attached to the notices, as had
been attached to the information disclosed in Center for Auto Safety, CBP expected such
confidentiality to be kept as a result of previous customary action. See generally Ctr. for Auto
Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
176. 925 F.2d 1225, 1228 (9th Cir. 1991).
177. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195.
178. Compare Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228 (noting that the FDA had provided documents to
Bowen with no apparent restrictions), with Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1198 (finding that the
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Additionally, the prior disclosure in Bowen was not considered official, just as
the notices were not an official disclosure in Watkins.179
More troublesome, the Ninth Circuit did not rely on any prior Exemption 4
case law to reach its decision regarding waiver, instead distinguishing past
cases in which the public-domain test was used for other exemptions. 180
Without any precedential support, the court determined that the public-domain
test “should not be the only test for government waiver.” 181 The court’s
reasoning for applying a new rule in this case is flawed.182 Additionally, the
court’s reasoning notably lacks a supported explanation for why the
well-recognized public-domain test does not adequately balance the underlying
purposes of FOIA and its exemptions in this context while the
unlimited-disclosure test does.183
The Ninth Circuit stated that “[t]aken to its logical extreme, the ‘public
domain’ test would still shield commercial information under Exemption 4
even if CBP or an aggrieved trademark owner opened up the phonebook and
faxed a copy of the seizure notice to every importer in the region.”184 This
statement turns the waiver doctrine on its head because it ignores that
government action in a prior disclosure is the focus of the waiver doctrine,
rather than what any individual might do with the information.185 Here, the
limited release of the notices to the trademark owners is quite distinguishable
from an official release to the entire public. 186 Furthermore, nothing in
Watkins indicated that the information at issue was ever disseminated beyond

government does not impose any restriction on the information’s dissemination when disclosure
is made to a trademark owner).
179. Compare Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228–29 (describing the release to Bowen as “erroneous”
and “inadvertent[]”), with Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (describing the release of the notices as a
“disclosure to a third party,” but not as an official disclosure to the public).
180. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1196–98 (citing to cases that applied the public-domain test in
the context of “requests for sensitive information involving high-level criminal investigations or
matters of national security”); see also Bowen, 925 F.2d at 1228–29 (explaining that prior Agency
disclosures do not automatically nullify subsequent exemption claims). The Watkins decision
fails to mention any Exemption 4 case law that has applied the public-domain test. See, e.g.,
Mobil Oil Corp. v. U.S. E.P.A., 879 F.2d 698, 700–01 (9th Cir. 1989) (stating that voluntary
disclosures have “sometimes been held to waive FOIA exemptions” and noting that “[t]he policy
underlying the exemption of certain categories of documents from FOIA disclosure requirements
is that ‘legitimate governmental and private interests could be harmed by the release of certain
types of information’” (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 621 (1982))).
181. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197.
182. Id.
183. See id. at 1197–98.
184. Id. at 1197.
185. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015–16 & n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980)
(“[T]he extent to which prior agency disclosure may constitute a waiver of the FOIA exemptions
must depend both on the circumstances of prior disclosure and on the particular exemptions
claimed.” (emphasis added)).
186. See supra Part I.D.
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the trademark owners themselves, 187 a burden that Watkins had to meet to
prevail on the claim that an exemption has been waived.188 Had CBP moved
for a protective order, the Ninth Circuit could have made efforts to remedy
their concerns by prohibiting the trademark owners from disclosing the
notices.189 This solution seems much simpler than creating an entirely new test
for the situation at hand.
The Ninth Circuit expressed concerns about the “logical extreme” of the
public-domain test, but failed to consider the “logical extreme” of its new
test. 190 The unlimited-disclosure test states that “when an agency freely
discloses to a third party confidential information covered by a FOIA
exemption without limiting the third-party’s ability to further disseminate the
information then the agency waives the ability to claim an exemption to a
FOIA request for the disclosed information.”191 This test opens the door for a
deluge of litigation surrounding the meaning of the Ninth Circuit’s holding
because the court failed to define key terms such as “freely discloses,”
“limiting,” and “third party.”192 If the agency’s disclosure to trademark owners
is done “freely” even though such disclosure is mandated by statute,193 what is
a coerced or involuntary disclosure? Does an independent contractor who
works with the agency qualify as a third party? What sort of limit on the third
party’s further dissemination of the information is sufficient to rebut an
argument for waiver? The court answered none of these questions, creating the
need for guesswork in future cases. 194 As noted in Critical Mass,
governmental disclosure of confidential information provided by persons may
result in the collection of less reliable information in the future. 195
Additionally, CBP sometimes seizes legitimate goods due to suspicion of
187. Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197 (providing that the trademark owner could compromise the
information by freely dissemination the information to third parties, but failing to identify any
actual further dissemination).
188. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC, 873 F.2d 325, 342 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (noting the
unfairness that would result if the party arguing against disclosure “would have to identify all of
the public sources in which the information contained in its documents is not reproduced”); see
also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
189. See, e.g., Parker v. Bureau of Land Mgmt., 141 F. Supp. 2d 71, 80 (D.D.C. 2001)
(stating that “inadvertent disclosure does not render . . . information publicly available for the
purposes of future FOIA requests” and that the court could arguably issue a protective order to
prevent further disclosures).
190. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1197.
191. Id. at 1198.
192. See id.
193. Id. at 1197–98 (determining that disclosure under 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) was a “no strings
attached” disclosure); see also 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (providing that the secretary shall
notify the trademark owner when a good bears a counterfeit mark resembling the owner’s
trademark).
194. See id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (stating that unlike the new test, the
public-domain test is a clear rule that can be applied without guesswork).
195. Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
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trademark infringement, in which case the importer has done nothing wrong.196
The eventual disclosure of the information in the notices would cause exactly
the competitive harm Exemption 4 was designed to prevent because others will
become aware of the importer’s trading partners, supply chains, and the
manufacturers with whom they are dealing.197 Fear of this harm will make
those providing the information in the notices reluctant to provide accurate
information to the government in the future.198
III. A SOLUTION: PUBLIC DOMAIN FOR ALL
The public-domain test has been and continues to be effective in deciding
whether a waiver has occurred.199 The issue of waiver is particularly important
with regard to Exemption 4 because, unlike other exemptions, Exemption 4
protects information “obtained from a ‘person’ rather than information
generated by the government.”200 Therefore, the government must ensure that
such information is protected to avoid competitive harm to others who entrust
the government with their confidential information.201 Up until Watkins, the
public-domain test had effectively served this purpose.202
The Ninth Circuit’s new unlimited-disclosure test enables disclosure of
confidential information under FOIA in circumstances in which the
information is not otherwise accessible to the public.203 The mere chance that
trademark owners could disseminate the information to others should not be
sufficient to show that confidentiality has been waived because the information
has not actually been disclosed in a public fashion.204 The new test would
require agencies and the courts to speculate as to whether a third party may

196. See Watkins, 643 F.3d at 1195 (acknowledging that “importers sometimes acquiesce in
the Agency’s seizure and forfeiture of legitimate goods,” and therefore the notices do not
necessarily document counterfeit merchandise).
197. See id. at 1196.
198. Cf. id. (providing that less reliable information may be provided in the future if
confidentiality is not maintained).
199. See id. at 1199 (Rymer, J., dissenting) (arguing that the public-domain test should be
adopted by the Ninth Circuit); see also Part I.D.
200. See Nat’l Parks & Conservation Ass’n v. Morton, 498 F.2d 765, 767 (D.C. Cir. 1974)
(reasoning that if information is disclosed, people may decline to cooperate in the future, which
will impair government decision making).
201. See id.
202. See supra Part I.D (discussing the public-domain test as used to determine the
applicability of FOIA’s waiver doctrine).
203. See supra Part II.B (arguing that the Ninth Circuit improperly focused on potential
disclosures, rather than actual disclosures).
204. See supra Part I.D (explaining that a waiver occurs when information is actually
disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record).
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make further disclosures, rather than focusing on whether the government has
made such disclosures and under what circumstances.205
By creating a new test, the Ninth Circuit fashioned a rule inconsistent with
both the core purpose of Exemption 4, which Congress intended to protect
confidential commercial information provided by others, 206 and the overall
purpose of FOIA to “establish a general philosophy of full agency
disclosure.”207 If the Watkins holding stands, the concerns voiced by the court
in Critical Mass regarding the continued availability and reliability of useful
information may come to fruition. 208 Individuals who provide commercial
information to the government, will be less willing to do so, and if compelled
to do so, will provide less reliable information for fear that any government
disclosure of the information—even a limited one—will subject the
information to FOIA disclosure.209 Although the Watkins test might appear to
accord with FOIA because it provides greater access to information, 210 the
increase in disclosure will result in a decrease in both the quality and quantity
of information provided to the government in the future211—a result directly at
odds with the interest sought to be protected under Exemption 4.212
Moreover, the Watkins holding has created variance among federal courts in
an area where uniformity is essential.213 Access to information through FOIA
should not vary based on the jurisdiction within which the documents are
located; yet, this is the exact effect of the Ninth Circuit’s decision. 214
Information that would typically be protected by Exemption 4 in jurisdictions
205. See Carson v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 631 F.2d 1008, 1015 n.30 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (“[T]he
extent to which prior agency disclosure may constitute a waiver of FOIA exemptions must
depend both on the circumstances of prior disclosure and on the particular exemptions claimed.”).
In looking at the specific facts of the prior release of the notices, the court should have focused on
what actually happened, not the possibility of other scenarios.
206. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965).
207. Id. at 4.
208. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992)
(observing that when information is compelled, persons fearing a likelihood of disclosure will be
more likely to provide less reliable information, and when information is not compelled, persons
will be less likely to provide any).
209. See id. (describing how people will be less likely to trust the government to maintain
confidentiality).
210. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197–98 (9th
Cir. 2011).
211. See Critical Mass, 975 F.2d at 878.
212. Id. (exempting confidential commercial information to further the government’s interest
in obtaining reliable information); see supra Part I.C.3.iv.
213. See supra Part II.B.
214. Cf. S. REP NO. 89-813, at 5 (1965) (stating that FOIA eliminates the test for who gets
access to different information); see also NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132, 143 n.10
(1975) (stating that requesters’ rights under FOIA do not increase or decrease because they claim
a greater interest in the information than others); United Tech. Corp. v. Fed. Aviation Admin.,
102 F.3d 688, 692 (2d Cir. 1996) (“[T]he test outlined in National Parks does not appear to
contemplate its application on a requester-specific basis.”).
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following the public-domain test will likely be disclosed through the unlimited
disclosure test in the Ninth Circuit.215
A. A Supreme Court Holding: Solidifying the Public-Domain Test
In the fall of 2011, the Supreme Court denied a petition for certiorari in
Prison Legal News v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, a case involving the
scope of the public-domain test.216 The petition raised the question of whether
the government can invoke a FOIA exemption when it has disclosed the same
records “by placing them in the public domain as unsealed evidence in a public
trial.”217 Because the Supreme Court decided not to grant certiorari, the Prison
Legal News holding that the government could still invoke the exemption
prevails and suggests that even those disclosures made in a relatively public
setting, such as at trial, do not automatically result in the waiver of a FOIA
exemption. 218 The Prison Legal News holding highlights the weakness of
Watkins.219 If documents such as those requested in Prison Legal News are
exempt from disclosure, 220 then limited release of the notices to trademark
owners cannot constitute a waiver when the release is both less public and less
of an official disclosure.221
Following the Prison Legal News denial of certiorari and given the Ninth
Circuit’s departure from the well-established test for waiver, a Supreme Court
ruling on the validity of the Watkins test would be the best solution, given that
the waiver doctrine has evolved through the common law and is not prescribed
by statute. 222 A grant of certiorari in Watkins, and a subsequent reversal,
would allow the Supreme Court to directly address the Ninth Circuit’s finding
that the public-domain test “should not be the only test for government

215. Compare supra Part I.D (describing the public-domain test and the requirement that
information be officially disclosed and preserved in a permanent public record), with supra Part
I.E.2 (describing the broader test established in Watkins).
216. See Prison Legal News v. Exec. Office for U.S. Attorneys, 628 F.3d 1243, 1252–53
(10th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 473 (2011).
217. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Prison Legal News, 132 S. Ct. 473 (No. 10-1510),
2011 WL 2421269.
218. See Prison Legal News, 628 F.3d at 1252–53 (explaining that the applicable exemption
can still serve its purpose because the pictures were displayed to a limited group of people and not
physically disseminated).
219. See supra Part II.B.
220. See Prison Legal News, 628 F.3d at 1253 (determining that specific images used in a
trial were not publically disclosed).
221. See supra Part II.B. Although there was physical dissemination of the notices to the
trademark owners in Watkins, a factor not present in Prison Legal News, the notices were
obtained by a limited group of people directly interested in the information provided. As
courtrooms and trials are typically open to the public, the images displayed in Prison Legal are
arguably more “public” than the privately mailed notices in Watkins, even when the physical
dissemination factor is present.
222. See supra Part I.D.
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waiver.” 223
Alternatively, the Supreme Court could bring the
unlimited-disclosure test within the scope of the public-domain test by
expanding its definition of what is “public.” This would allow for a uniform
approach to the waiver doctrine. In either case, the information at issue in
Watkins should be shielded from disclosure due to the uniform understanding
of the waiver doctrine at the time the notices were released.
B. A Legislative Solution: Amending FOIA
Congressional action provides an alternative to Supreme Court review.
Congress has amended FOIA several times in the past,224 and is in a position to
establish a prevailing test for waiver by creating, for example, a new § 552(c)
immediately following the nine exemptions detailed in § 552(b). 225 The
amendment could establish that an agency would waive the exemptions
enumerated above if the materials requested were: (1) released in a prior
official disclosure, or (2) could be found in the public domain.226 Because the
courts have already made attempts to define both official disclosure and when
information is public,227 Congress could defer to those definitions unless there
was a strong desire to solidify the definitions within the statute itself.
Additionally, Congress could amend the statute governing the notices of
seizure to specifically exempt their context from disclosure,228 which would
bring the notices within the protection of Exemption 3.229
C. An Executive Response to Watkins: Amending the Seizure Regulations
In the absence of a legislative amendment, the executive branch could limit
the holding of Watkins by amending the regulations governing the notices of
seizure.
The amendment could require that the notices contain a
confidentiality statement 230 or limit the type of information included in the
notices so as to avoid the disclosure of confidential commercial or financial
information altogether.231 In fact, prior to the current version of the regulation,

223. See Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot., 643 F.3d 1189, 1197 (9th Cir.
2011) (emphasis in original).
224. See supra Part I.B (discussing FOIA’s enactment and subsequent amendment).
225. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (2006 & Supp. IV 2010).
226. See supra Part I.D.
227. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
228. See 19 U.S.C. § 1526(e) (2006) (providing that the secretary should give notice to
aggrieved trademark owners when a design replicates their trademark).
229. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(3) (Supp. IV 2010) (exempting information that has been
“specifically exempted from disclosure by statute”).
230. See Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 93 F. Supp. 2d. 1, 18
(D.D.C. 2000) (highlighting that the prior disclosures included confidentiality notices), rev’d in
part on other grounds, 244 F.3d 144 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
231. See 19 C.F.R § 133 (2011) (setting forth the information required to be included in the
notices).
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the agency satisfied the notice requirements by simply informing the trademark
owner that a seizure occurred.232
In the meantime, courts should continue to apply the well-established
public-domain test while agencies should attempt to distinguish Watkins where
possible and make efforts to affix a confidentiality notice to documents that are
disclosed. In doing so, the precedential effect of Watkins will be limited, thus
protecting the underlying purposes of Exemption 4.233
IV. CONCLUSION
The Freedom of Information Act’s waiver doctrine is an area in which
uniformity is crucial. Finding that an exemption has been waived based on the
potential for third parties to disseminate the information will result in
inconsistent decisions. Consistent with FOIA, information should be disclosed
to those requesting it based on the government’s actions.234 Varying levels of
access to information based on a document’s location are contrary to the goals
of FOIA, which seeks to permit any person to obtain information from the
federal government.235 Although the main purpose of FOIA is the disclosure
of information, 236 recognition of legitimate confidential interests for
commercial information is one of the recognized goals reflected in Exemption
4.237 As stated in Critical Mass, agencies must consider the future reliability of
information obtained if commercial entities are under the impression that their
confidential information may be released through a future FOIA request.238
The public-domain test has thus far functioned successfully in striking a
suitable balance between the public’s interest in disclosure and third parties’
interests in keeping their information confidential;239 the same cannot be said
of the unlimited-disclosure test. A true loss of confidentiality requires more
than just the potential for further dissemination. Without an appropriate
balancing of these competing interests, the quantity and quality of information
received will surely be reduced.

232. See Appellant’s Reply Brief at 16, Watkins v. U.S. Bureau of Customs & Border Prot.,
643 F.3d 1189 (9th Cir. 2011) (No. 09-35996), 2010 WL 894744 (explaining that before 19
C.F.R. § 133.21 only notice of the fact of a seizure had to be disclosed).
233. See supra Part I.C.
234. See supra Part I.B.
235. See supra Part I.B.
236. See supra Part I.B.
237. See S. REP. NO. 89-813, at 9 (1965); see also H.R. REP. N O. 89-1497, at 10 (1966).
238. See Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC, 975 F.2d 871, 878 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
239. See supra Part I.D.
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